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Abstract
We develop a model of endogenous mergers to study their dynamic process.
Firms choose whether, when, and with whom to merge. Two necessary conditions
are identied for mergers to occur: rm heterogeneity and negative demand shocks.
We show that mergers are strategic complements and therefore tend to occur in
waves. Moreover, some mergers occur for strategic reasons in order to precipitate
further mergers.
Keywords: endogenous mergers, strategic mergers, merger waves, rm hetero-
geneity, demand shocks
JEL Code: L13, L41, D43
1 Introduction
Mergers have become increasingly widespread in recent years. According to the UNs
World Investment Report (UN, 2000), worldwide mergers and acquisitions (M&A) grew
at an annual rate of 42 percent over the period 1980-1999 to reach US$2.3 trillion in 1999.
More than 24,000 M&A took place during that period, and the value of M&A relative
to world GDP rose from 0.3 percent in 1980 to 2 percent in 1990 and to 8 percent in
1999. Standard & Poors has predicted that consolidation through M&A would reduce
the number of auto companies from 40 in 1998 to about 20 in the 21st century.1
Economic studies of horizontal mergers have focused mainly on two questions: why
rms merge, and how they merge. To answer the rst question, researchers have typically
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1Bill Vlasic, The rst global car colossus(BusinessWeek, May 18, 1998, p.40).
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assumed a single merger, which is decided by a number of designated rms collectively.
Non-participants are supposed to remain independent.2 Because the merger structure
(who merges with whom and who remains independent) is exogenously imposed on the
rms, mergers modeled in such a way are called exogenous mergers. To address the
second question of how rms merge, the exogenous merger structure must be abandoned
and the merger process must be modeled explicitly. In particular, rms must make
their merger decisions individually. Mergers that result from such a process are called
endogenous mergers. Once rms are allowed to make individual choices, the resulting
industry dynamics are greatly enriched, as multiple mergers may occur and rms may
merge in response to some other mergers.
In this study, we present a model of endogenous mergers and study how rms merge
in a dynamic process. Firms play a two-stage game. In the rst stage, mergers occur
sequentially in an endogenized order. Each merger is between one proposing rm that
is drawn randomly and one target rm that is chosen by the proposer. After a merger
is completed, another randomly drawn rm may propose another merger. This process
continues until no further mergers occur, which ends the rst stage. In the second stage,
the surviving rms engage in Cournot competition and receive their payo¤s.
We identify two necessary conditions for mergers to occur. Mergers occur only if
rms have di¤erent marginal costs and the industry has experienced a shock that reduces
demand. In Cournot competition, the protability of any given merger depends on the
interaction between two forces: the merging rms internalize the competition between
themselves, which benets them, and the non-merging rms free ride on the reduced
competition by competing more aggressively, which hurts the merging rms. If rms
are homogeneous with constant marginal costs, Salant et al (1983) have shown that the
second force dominates and, therefore, a two-rm merger will never occur. If rms are
heterogeneous with di¤erent marginal costs, as in our model, merging rms will improve
their production e¢ ciency through technology transfer and therefore receive some extra
2One exception is Deneckere and Davidson (1985), who discussed stable coalition structures, i.e.,
coalition structures that are immune to further mergers.
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benet. For a given cost di¤erential between the merging rms, the benet is relatively
large if the market size is small. A reduction of the market size, resulting from a negative
demand shock, may therefore turn an unprotable merger into a protable one and cause
the merger to occur.
The extensive-form game that we use allows us to characterize the equilibrium merger
strategies, which usually lead to a unique path of mergers. For example, in a four-rm
industry, we show that a negative demand shock will lead to a merger between the
two rms with intermediate e¢ ciency, followed by another merger between the most
and least e¢ cient rms. Indeed, such a pattern can be found in the real world. In
1986, the four largest brands in the U.S. carbonated soft drink industry were Coca-Cola,
Pepsi, Seven-up and Dr Pepper, with respective retail sales shares of 37.4%, 28.9%,
5.7% and 4.6% (White, 1989). In January of that year, Pepsi announced its intention to
purchase Seven-up. Three weeks later, Coca-Cola announced its intention to purchase Dr
Pepper. Although neither merger materialized due to antitrust objections,3 the sequence
of announced mergers matches the predictions from our analysis.
We nd that mergers are strategic complements in the sense that rmsincentives
to merge increase when some other rms also merge. This is because other mergers
reduce the number of free riders for a given merger, making the merger more protable.
The complementarity between mergers implies that forward-looking rms may engage
in mergers strategically. That is, rms may carry out an otherwise unprotable merger
in order to facilitate some further mergers that might otherwise not occur. We demon-
strate the presence of strategic mergers in many cases. Because mergers are strategic
complements, they tend to occur together, leading to a merger wave. Hence, our study
o¤ers an explanation for the well documented observation that mergers tend to occur
in waves, one of the most consistent empirical features of merger activity over the last
century(Andrade, Mitchell and Sta¤ord, 2001).
3 In June 1986, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) decided that these mergers were likely to be
anticompetitive and declared its preliminary decision to oppose them. Pepsi and Seven-up immediately
canceled their merger plans, but Coca-Cola appealed to the Federal District Court and eventually lost
the case.
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The predictions of our model are supported by empirical and anecdotal evidence. In
a cross-industry empirical study of takeover activity in the 1980s, Mitchell and Mulherin
(1996) related many mergers to negative industry shocks: A shock-driven decline in
demand can ... pressure rms to merge ... (p.197). Dutz (1989) presented evidence
of mergers in the steel industry as it faced declining demand. In the popular media,
declining demand is often given as one of the major reasons behind some industries
merger waves. Furthermore, industrial analysts often view certain mergers as a response
to other mergers in the same industry. Commenting on a merger between two oil compa-
nies, Conoco and Philips Petroleum, an article in The Economist magazine (November,
22, 2001) remarked It is surely no coincidence that the previous wave of mergers swelled
just as oil prices collapsed to around $10 a barrel.Completed in 1999, the $88 billion
merger between Exxon and Mobil was the largest in U.S. corporate history. That merger
was thought to be a response to declining demand and a previous merger between two
of the industrys major players.4
The growing literature on endogenous mergers is still small. Previous contributions
have been made by Kamien and Zang (1990), Barros (1998), Gowrisankaran (1999),
Fauli-Oller (2000), and Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004).5 Due to the complexity of the
problem, the merger process in most models is endogenized only partially. For example,
researchers have restricted the number of rms to three (Barros, 1998) or four (Fauli-
Oller, 2000), or assumed that mergers occur in a pre-determined order (Gowrisankaran,
1999; Fauli-Oller, 2000). Our study, by contrast, attempts to model endogenous mergers
more completely. We assume an arbitrary number of rms which may di¤er in their
4Decreased demand for oil, along with overproduction, caused oil prices to plummet in the late 1990s,
... the biggest rms in the oil industry began seeking large scale consolidation.British Petroleum and
Amoco were two of the rst rms to pursue such a move in August 1998. A few months later, Mobil and
Exxon began eyeing each other....just a few weeks after the mergers announcement, Frances Total SA
and Belgiums Petrona SA joined the consolidation frenzy. In March of 1999, BP Amoco and Atlantic
Richeld unveiled their $25 billion merger plans.(Hill, 1999, p.415). Similar dynamics can be found in
virtually every industry: pharmaceuticals (The Economist, March 27, 2004, p.60), health management
(Hill, 1999, p.17), software (The Economist, December 29, 2004), pulp and paper (Hill, 1999, p.258), and
automobiles (New York Times, November 14, 1998).
5Some researchers have used cooperative games to analyze endogenous mergers (Barros, 1998; Horn
and Persson, 2001). For our purpose of analyzing the dynamic process of mergers, the non-cooperative
game is the proper analytical tool.
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marginal costs, and we endogenize the order of mergers. Although Kamien and Zang
(1990) modeled the merger process in a general way, because their rms are identical,
they missed the more interesting question of what mergers will occur. They concluded
only that full monopolization through mergers will not happen.
Although merger waves prevail in reality, few existing models are su¢ ciently rich to
explain them. By modeling mergers in a simultaneous game, Kamien and Zang (1990)
excluded the possibility of strategic mergers and merger waves. While Gowrisankaran
(1999) assumed that mergers occur sequentially, his analysis focused on industry dynam-
ics through merger, investment, entry and exit with random returns, rather than on the
strategic interaction between mergers. To our knowledge, Fauli-Oller (2000) has pro-
vided the only theoretical framework for the study of strategic mergers,6 but his merger
game (two e¢ cient rms take turns to bid for two ine¢ cient rms) is not completely
endogenous. We analyze strategic mergers when the merger structure and sequence are
both endogenous, thus providing a more realistic setting for the study of merger waves.
The paper is organized as follows. After setting up the model in Section 2, we discuss
rm strategies and the protability of mergers in Section 3. These results are needed in
later analysis to derive the equilibria. In Section 4, a four-rm industry is thoroughly
analyzed as a special case. We show how to derive the equilibrium. All of the major
results in the study, including negative demand shocks as causes of mergers, strategic
mergers and merger waves, are present in this special case. Finally, Section 5 presents
the results for the general case and discusses their implications. All proofs are provided
in the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider an industry in which n (n  3) risk-neutral rms produce a homogeneous
good. The set of these rms is denoted as N . Each rm has a constant marginal cost,
ci  0 for rm i (i = 1; 2;    ; n), and zero xed costs. The rms are indexed so that
6Nilssen and Sorgard (1998) studied the interaction between two sequential exogenous mergers.
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c1  c2      cn. Market demand is given as p =  Q, where p is the market price,
Q is the total output of the n rms, and  represents the market size. Assume no entry.
Firms can merge. Assume that any merger is between two rms. Because marginal
costs are constant, when two rms merge the merged entity will shut down the high-cost
unit and use only the low-cost unit for production. Let i+j stand for the merger between
rms i and j. Then, the merged entitys marginal cost is equal to minfci; cjg, or cminfi;jg.
Therefore, a merger can be viewed as an acquisition of a high-cost rm (hereafter the
acquiree) by a low-cost rm (hereafter the acquirer).
The rms engage in a two-stage game. In the rst stage, they make merger decisions.
Assume that mergers take place sequentially in multiple rounds, one round for each
merger. The number of rounds will be determined endogenously. A rm may participate
in multiple rounds of mergers as long as it has not been acquired. At the beginning of
each round, a rm is drawn randomly from the pool of existing rms. The drawn rm
may pass or propose a merger. If it passes, there will be another random draw from the
same pool. If the rm proposes (in which case it is called the proposer), it species a
merger partner (the target) and an acquisition price that is paid by the acquirer to the
acquiree.7 The target may then accept or reject the proposal. If the target accepts, the
merger takes place (i.e., the acquiree leaves with the payment) and the game proceeds
to the next round. If the target rejects the proposal, the entire merger stage ends.8 If
all rms have been drawn and they all choose to pass, the merger stage also ends. In
the second stage, all remaining rms carry out Cournot competition and receive their
payo¤s. We look for the Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) of the game, i.e., equilibria
in which rmsstrategies depend only on payo¤-relevant histories of their past actions
(Maskin and Tirole, 1989).
Two clarications are in order. First, we use two distinct pairs of terms to describe the
relationships between two rms that merge. In the acquirer-acquiree pair, the acquirer
7 If the proposer is the acquirer, it o¤ers to acquire the target at the price; if the proposer is the
acquiree, it asks to be acquired at the price.
8We have also analyzed an alternative merger game in which the game continues even when a merger
proposal is rejected. We found no change to the equilibrium. See the discussion in the conclusion.
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has the lower cost and the acquiree has the higher cost. In the proposer-target pair,
the proposer is the rm who makes a merger proposal and the target is the rm which
receives the proposal. Depending on their relative costs, both the proposer and the target
can be an acquirer or an acquiree. Second, our extensive-form game implies that the
proposer captures the entire surplus of a particular merger. That is, the proposer has
all the bargaining power ex post. However, since the two merging rms have an equal
chance of being the proposer, they have the same bargaining power ex ante.
We make two assumptions.
Assumption 1.   0  (n+ 1)cn   ni=1ci.
Assumption 2. Mergers can proceed up to a duopoly, but full monopolization is not
allowed.
The rst assumption ensures that all rms produce non-negative quantities. There
are two justications for the second assumption. On the one hand, it captures the idea
that, somewhere down the road in the merger process, the antitrust authority will step
in and prevent a merger that will substantially increase the existing rmsmarket power.
On the other hand, if full monopolization is allowed, we can show that, without a trigger,
mergers occur spontaneously and the industry invariably ends up with a monopoly. Then
the original market structure of n rms is unjustiable. Note that the cuto¤ line between
monopoly and duopoly is inconsequential. If the line is moved so that the industry must
have at least three or four rms, our major conclusions still hold.
For convenience, we list the following notation that is used in the analysis (exact
denitions are provided later):
M : a subset of N
Mi : rm is Cournot prot in M
vMi : rm is expected payo¤ in M
uM;i+jk for k 2 fi; jg :  vMnmaxfi;jgminfi;jg   Mfi;jgnk, proposer ks payo¤ from i+ j in M
Mi;j :  vMnmaxfi;jgminfi;jg   Mi   Mj , protability of i+ j in M
Mi;j : value of  below which i+ j is protable in M
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3 Preliminaries
In this section, we rst derive the second-stage equilibrium for any given merger outcome
resulting from the rst-stage game. Then, we move back to the rst stage to analyze
rmsstrategies and the protability of the mergers. The analysis serves as the stepping
stone for us to derive the equilibrium of the whole game.
 The second-stage: Cournot prots
Consider a set, M  N , of rms that engage in Cournot competition. We can easily















where m  jM j is the number of rms in M and CM =
P
j2M cj . Immediately, we have:




i for all i 2M 0 M .
Lemma 1 implies that a rm benets from mergers among its competitors, a conclu-
sion known in the literature as the free-riding e¤ect of mergers (Salant et al., 1983).
 The rst-stage: Strategies and merger protability
Given a set, M , of rms, let vMi denote rm is (i 2 M) expected payo¤ in M . If
there is no merger in M , vMi = 
M
i . If, in a merger proposal, i acquires j at acquisition
price T , then, conditional on the proposal being accepted, vMi = v
Mnj
i   T , vMj = T and
vMk = v
Mnj
k for k 2Mnfi; jg. As we will see, vMi and Mi are two important values that
determine is optimal strategies in the merger stage.
A rm needs to make a decision when it is drawn or when it is a target. A drawn
rm chooses between passand propose a mergerand, in the latter case, chooses the
target and the acquisition price. A target chooses between acceptand reject.
 Targets optimal strategy and proposers acquisition price
Lemma 2. If i proposes acquiring j at acquisition price T , then,
(a) j accepts the proposal if and only if T  Mj for i < j and T  vMnij   Mj for
i > j.
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(b) is optimal acquisition price is T = Mj for i < j and T = v
Mni
j   Mj for i > j.
Therefore, once a target, say, j, is chosen, the acquisition price will be such that
the targets expected payo¤, regardless of whether it is the acquirer or acquiree, is Mj ,
and the target will accept the proposal. As a result, the proposer, say, i, has a payo¤
uM;i+ji = v
Mnmaxfi;jg
minfi;jg   Mj . From now on, we focus on the proposers other choices;
namely whether to pass or propose and, in the latter case, to whom.
 Proposers preferences
Based on Lemmas 1 and 2, we have vMi  Mi for any i 2 M . The following two
lemmas state a proposers preference.
Lemma 3. For i; j 2M and i < j, uM;i+ji < vMnji .
Lemma 4. For i; j; k 2M and i < j < k, if there is no further merger,
(a) uM;i+kk > u
M;j+k
k ;
(b) uM;i+ki > u
M;i+j















Lemma 3 states that a proposer prefers passing if its intended acquiree will be ac-
quired by a third rm. Lemma 4 indicates a proposers optimal choice of target when
there is no further merger: if the proposer seeks to be acquired, its target should be the
most e¢ cient rm in M ; if the proposer seeks to acquire some rm, its target should
generally be the least e¢ cient rm in M .9 The intuition for Lemma 4 is the following.
When a rm (k) is acquired, regardless of who the acquirer is, the market structure
after the merger is the same: rm k drops out and market competition is reduced. A
more e¢ cient acquirer, however, benets more from the reduced competition and there-
fore generates more surplus to the merging rms. When a rm (i) proposes acquiring
another rm, the market structure after the merger depends on who the acquiree is.
A more e¢ cient acquiree means the elimination of a stronger rival and thus a greater
reduction of competition. However, i needs to pay more for the elimination because the
acquirees pre-merger prot is also higher. In Cournot competition, the acquirer pays
9The condition for (b) is generally satised unless both acquirees are extremely weak and there are
very few rms in M .
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the full cost of eliminating a rival but receives only a fraction of the benet of the re-
duced competition (the free-riding e¤ect). It turns out that the merger is generally more
protable when the acquiree is less e¢ cient.
 Merger protability
Denote Mi;j  vMnmaxfi;jgminfi;jg  Mi  Mj as the protability of i+ j inM . The merger
is said to be protable if and only if Mi;j  0. An unprotable merger will never
take place because neither of the two rms will propose it; passing is a better choice:
vMi  Mi > vMnmaxfi;jgminfi;jg  Mj = uM;i+ji and similarly for rm j. Protability is therefore
a necessary condition for a merger to take place. The following lemma gives a su¢ cient
condition.
Lemma 5. Given M , if i+ j is the only protable merger, then there is a unique MPE in
which (when drawn to move) i proposes to j, j proposes to i, and all other rms pass.
The MPE results in a unique equilibrium merger of i+ j.
For a merger to occur as the unique equilibrium, a su¢ cient condition is that the
merger is the only protable merger in M . This condition is not necessary. Even if there
exist multiple protable mergers, a merger i + j may still be the unique equilibrium.
This will be the case if the equilibrium strategies are such that i and j propose to each
other while all other rms pass.
If i + j is the unique equilibrium merger in M , Lemma 2 implies that i receives




i (when j proposes to i) with
























i;j . That is, for a unique equilibrium merger, the two merging
rms expect to split the merger surplus equally.
We now state the market condition for a protable merger.
Lemma 6. Consider a possible merger between i and j (i < j) in M with m  3 and
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assume no further mergers. Then, i+ j is protable if and only if
  (m+ 1)
(m  1)2   2

(m2   1)cj   2mci
	  CM  Mi;j :
Notice that the condition is never satised if all costs are identical: Mi;j = 0 = c if
ck = c for k 2 M . Merging rms reduce their competition in order to raise their joint
prots. The reduced competition, however, induces non-merging rms to expand, which
hurts the merged rms.10 If costs are identical, the damage from non-merging rms
expansion dominates and the merger is never protable (Salant et al, 1983). If costs
are di¤erent, the merging rms gain some extra benet from the improved production
e¢ ciency.11 Since costs are measured relative to the market size, when  is small,
the e¢ ciency improvement from a given cost di¤erential is substantial and the merger
becomes protable.
4 Special cases
Lemmas 1-6 help us derive the rmsequilibrium strategies that result in an equilibrium
merger conguration, i.e., a series of mergers in a particular order. In this section, we
demonstrate how this can be done through the special case of n = 4. The analysis allows
us to see some interesting features of mergers such as strategic mergers and merger waves.
It also shows how mergers may be triggered by demand shocks.
The general procedure of deriving the equilibrium is the following. List all possible
merger congurations. For every conguration, nd the range of  in which the con-
guration is protable, i.e., every merger in the conguration is protable. Since the
last merger in any given conguration is protable only when  is below a critical value
(Lemma 6), the range of  for a protable conguration will necessarily have an upper
bound (and may also have a lower bound). Put together the congurations and the
10 If rms compete in prices, the reaction from non-merging rms will benet the merged rms (De-
neckere and Davidson, 1985).
11Production e¢ ciency is improved because the merged rms can produce any joint output at a cost
lower than that without the merger. We can think of the acquiree as adopting the more-advanced
technology from the acquirer.
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associated -ranges. Within a range, if there is only one protable conguration, it will
be the unique equilibrium (Lemma 5). If there are several protable congurations, we
need to further analyze each active rms preference among protable mergers in each
round using Lemmas 3 and 4 (see the Appendix for details in the specic cases of n = 3,
5 and 6). For any   0, such an analysis will lead to a unique MPE, from which the
equilibrium merger congurations can be derived.12
Now consider the case of N = f1; 2; 3; 4g with ci = i 1 for i 2 N . Then, 0 = 9. By
Assumption 2, a conguration can have at most two mergers. For congurations that
contain a single merger (there are six of them), Lemma 6 applies and the critical value
is Ni;j =
5
7(15cj   8ci)   6. The highest Ni;j is for i = 1 and j = 4 with N1;4 = 26:1.
Therefore, when  > 26:1, there is no equilibrium that contains a single merger.
Consider congurations that contain two sequential mergers. The acquiree in the
rst round must be rm 2, 3 or 4. If rm 2 is acquired (by rm 1) in the rst round, we
can show (see similar analysis for n = 3 in the Appendix) that the remaining rms will
have a further merger of 1 + 4 for 19 <   43 and no merger for  > 43. Given the
second-round merger, however, the rst-round merger, 1+2, is unprotable for  > 19.
If rm 3 is acquired (by 1 or 2) in the rst round, we can again show that the remaining
rms will have a further merger of 1 + 4 for 12 <   44 (and no merger for  > 44).
This implies two possible merger congurations: 1 + 3 ) 1 + 4 (i.e., 1+3 followed by
1+4) and 2 + 3 ) 1 + 4. We nd that the rst-round merger 1 + 3 is unprotable for
 > 22:2, while 2 + 3 is protable for any   0. Finally, if rm 4 is acquired in the
rst round, we can show (see the proof for the case of n = 3 in the Appendix) that the
remaining rms will not merge when  > 29.
In summary, for  2 (29; 44], 2 + 3 ) 1 + 4 is the only protable conguration. By
Lemma 5, there is a unique MPE: in the rst round, rms 2 and 3 propose to each other
while rms 1 and 4 pass; in the second round, rms 1 and 4 propose to each other while
12A unique MPE may or may not result in a unique merger conguration. For example, if all rms
pass in an equilibrium except i and j which propose to each other, the resulting conguration is uniquely
i+ j. If, on the other hand, i proposes to j while both j and k propose to i, the resulting conguration
is i+ j with probability 2
3




N Range of  Equilibrium Merger Conguration(s)
(29, 1) No merger
f1; 2; 3g (6.9, 29] 1 + 3
(6.6, 6.9] 1 + 3 with prob.23 and 1 + 2 with prob.
1
3
(5, 6.6] 1 + 2
f1; 2; 3; 4g (44, 1) No merger
(29, 44] 2 + 3) 1 + 4
f1; 2;    ; 5g (59, 1) No merger
(44, 59] 1 + 4) 2 + 3) 1 + 5
(74, 1) No merger
f1; 2;    ; 6g Slightly below 74 2 + i) 1 + j ) 2 + 3) 1 + 6, in which
i = 4 with prob.13 , i = 5 with prob.
2
3 , and j = f4; 5gni
Table 1: Equilibrium Merger Congurations for n=3,4,5,6.
rm 2 passes. The MPE results in a unique merger conguration: 2 + 3) 1 + 4.
A similar (albeit much more complicated) analysis can be used to derive the equi-
librium for  2 [0; 29], which shows that mergers always occur in this range. On the
other hand, the above analysis has revealed that no merger occurs for  > 44. In fact,
this pattern exists for any general n: there exists a critical value of  such that mergers
occur if and only if  is below the level.
The relationship between the two mergers in the equilibrium can be found by com-
paring the critical values of  for various merger congurations. It turns out that 2+3 is
unprotable unless 1 and 4 merge subsequently. Conversely, 1+4 is unprotable unless
2 and 3 have merged. We can show that rmsincentives to merge increase when other
rms also merge. Therefore, mergers are strategic complements, which immediately im-
plies that mergers tend to occur together, leading to a merger wave. Furthermore, in the
examples wave of mergers, the rst merger is strategic because, given it is unprotable,
it serves the explicit purpose of inducing a further merger that will otherwise not occur.
So far we have analyzed the case of n = 4. A similar analysis can be applied to
n = 3, 5, and 6 (with ci = i   1 for i 2 N), and we report in Table 1 the equilibrium
merger congurations of these cases. For n = 3, we have a complete characterization of
equilibrium merger congurations for   0; for n > 3, we only report the equilibrium
merger congurations for a subset of , as the complexity of the analysis increases with n
13
exponentially. The analyses and results reveal a common feature in all cases: mergers are
caused by negative demand shocks, they occur in waves, and some mergers are strategic.
5 The general case
Return now to the general case with n rms and general costs. Dene




where k 2 f1; 2;    ; n   2g, f(k) = (n k+1)3+n k+1
(n k)2 2 and g(k) =
2(n k)2+6n 6k+4
(n k)2 2 . As
shown in the Appendix, (k) is the value of  below which exactly k mergers occur in
N . Let  be the maximal value of  and k be the maximizer. We now state the main
result of the study.
Proposition. A necessary condition for any merger to occur is  < . If mergers occur
when  is slightly below , the merger conguration(s) must have the following features:
(a) there are k rounds of mergers;
(b) the k least e¢ cient rms are acquired; and
(c) the last-round merger is between rm 1 and rm n.
The Proposition provides a necessary condition for mergers. Firms start to merge
only when the market size, , is below a critical level. The Proposition also characterizes
some properties of the mergers for  slightly below the level. In the rest of this section,
we discuss the applications and implications of the Proposition.
 The role of demand shocks and rm heterogeneity
A model of endogenous mergers needs to explain not only how rms merge, but
also what triggers the mergers. We have used the special cases in the previous section
to demonstrate how rms merge. Now the Proposition identies one factor that may
trigger mergers: rms start to merge only when the demand is below a critical level.
Since the original market structure with n rms (i.e., no rms merge) must also be an
equilibrium, the demand must be above the critical level originally. Mergers therefore
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must have been caused by a drop in the demand. In other words, mergers are caused by
a negative demand shock.
Firm heterogeneity also plays an important role in mergers. If rms are identical,
i.e., ci = c for i 2 N , we have 0 = c and (k) = c for all k 2 [1; n   2], and the
necessary condition in the Proposition is never satised. Thus, rms will never merge in
response to any demand shock if they all have identical, constant marginal costs. This
result has also been obtained in other endogenous merger models in which rms move
simultaneously (Kamien and Zang, 1990; Thoron, 1998). Our result is stronger because
we show that rms do not merge even when they move sequentially. Indeed, we show
that rms will merge if their costs are su¢ ciently di¤erent.
 Strategic mergers and merger waves
An intriguing feature of the equilibrium characterized in the Proposition is that a
demand shock may cause multiple mergers (k  2) in sequence, i.e., a merger wave. In
some waves of mergers, each individual merger is an independent response to the shock.
In other waves, mergers are interdependent, i.e., some mergers occur because some other
mergers have already occurred. The latter case is particularly interesting and deserves
further discussion. Recall that free-riding by non-merging rms reduces the protability
of a given merger. If the number of free riders is reduced, an otherwise unprotable
merger may become protable. Between two potential mergers, if one merger occurs,
the number of rms that free ride on the second merger is reduced, making the second
merger more likely to occur. Therefore, rmsincentives to merge increase when other
mergers also occur. Mergers are strategic complements and, as a result, tend to occur in
waves.
Whether or not a demand shock will cause a merger wave depends mainly on the
number of rms in the industry. By assigning costs to the n rms, we can calculate
the values of (k) and determine k. Our numerical analysis shows that,13 typically,
13 If ci = i  1 for i 2 N , we nd that (k) increases with k when n < 9 (which means k = n  2) and
is U-shaped when n > 9 (which means k is either 1 or n   2). In the latter case, (1) < (n   2) for
n  23 (so k = n  2) and (1) > (n  2) for n > 23 (so k = 1).
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k = n  2 for n  23 and k = 1 for n > 23. Therefore, mergers tend to occur in waves
when n is small.
In our model, mergers occur sequentially. The complementarity between mergers then
opens the possibility for strategic behavior. Consider two potential mergers, A followed
by B. Neither is protable by itself. But if A has occurred, B becomes protable and will
therefore occur. Given that B will occur subsequently, A becomes protable as well. In
that case, A will be carried out. This merger is strategic because, although unprotable
by itself, the merger nevertheless occurs in order to induce further mergers that might
otherwise not occur. An example of such a strategic merger has been demonstrated
earlier in the case of n = 4.
 Pattern of the equilibrium merger conguration
The exact path of equilibrium mergers depends on the rms costs. In order to
search for some common features of the equilibrium merger path, we conduct a numerical
simulation, in which we assign random costs to the n rms and derive the corresponding
equilibrium congurations. A general pattern can be observed. The acquired rms are
generally acquired in the order of n 1, n 2,    , n (k 1), and nally n. If k = n 2
(i.e., the nal market is a duopoly), then rms 1 and 2 take turns to acquire the other
n   2 rms. If k 6= n   2, k is usually very small (k < n2 ). Then, the rst k rms
in N , in the order k, k   1,    ; 2, 1, take turns to do the acquiring. Notice that a
rm does not participate in any two consecutive mergers and a rm does not acquire
any other rm before itself being acquired.
 Production shocks
The discussion so far has focused on demand shocks as a cause for mergers. In fact,
the model can accommodate other causes. Recall from the Proposition that the condition
for mergers to take place is simply  being lower than , which is a linear combination
For general values of the costs, we conduct a numerical simulation by assigning random costs to the
n rms repeatedly. The results indicate that the shape of (k) is not sensitive to the cost distribution
and therefore the above pattern about k (i.e., k = n  2 for small n and k = 1 otherwise) continues
to hold.
It is also possible that k is greater than 1 (but smaller than n
2
). This happens for some special values
of the costs.
16
of the rmscosts. This condition may be satised if  drops while  does not change,
which corresponds to a demand shock. The condition may also be satised if  does
not change but  increases. This would be the case if there is a negative supply shock
that increases some or all rmscosts. Hence, regardless of demand or supply shocks,
rms start to merge only when business becomes tougher. The conclusion that negative
supply shocks may trigger mergers is also supported by empirical evidence.14
6 Concluding remarks
In this study, we present a model of endogenous mergers and analyze their dynamic
process. The equilibrium demonstrates that a negative demand shock may cause a
merger wave and that some mergers may occur for strategic reasons.
Although entry and exit are assumed away in our model, they can be incorporated.
As is evident from the expression of , exit of a rm reduces n, which tends to lower
. As a result, the necessary condition ( < ) is further relaxed and mergers will not
occur. On the other hand, entry by one or several new rms may make it more or less
likely for the condition to be satised.15 Thus, we conjecture that the exit of existing
rms tends to stabilize the market structure (i.e., make mergers less likely), while the
entry of new rms has the potential to change the market structure dramatically through
a merger wave.
Demand and costs are assumed to be linear mainly for tractability. As has been
pointed out by Perry and Porter (1985) and Cheung (1992), relaxing these assumptions
may a¤ect some quantitative results in exogenous mergers, where the equilibrium is
derived by comparing rmsprots before and after a designated merger. In endogenous
mergers, however, the comparison mainly focuses on each rms prot from merging with
14Jensen (1993) suggested that the consolidation in many industries can be traced to increased input
prices caused by the oil shocks of the 1970s. The Economist (November, 22, 2001) remarked: Thanks
to the rising cost and risk of exploration in ever more remote areas, life has got harder for oil companies.
That explains the wave of consolidation of the past three years that has seen Exxon take over Mobil, BP
buy Amoco and Arco, Total absorb Petrona and Elf Aquitaine, and Chevron buy Texaco.
15For example, in N = f1; 2; 3; 4g, entry by a rm whose cost is below c2 or greater than c4 may trigger
mergers, while exit by rm 3 or entry by one or more rms whose costs are between c2 and c4 will not
trigger any mergers.
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di¤erent partners. This comparison is less sensitive to the linearity assumptions, so the
qualitative conclusions of this study probably will not change when general demand and
cost functions are used. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to demonstrate this.
In our model, we assume that the merger stage ends whenever a merger proposal is
rejected. This assumption seems strong. Nevertheless, our results should continue to
hold when the assumption is relaxed. We have analyzed an alternative game, in which
a rejection does not end the merger stage and another proposer will be chosen among
the remaining rms. In the cases of n = 3, 4, 5 and 6, we can show that the equilibrium
merger congurations are the same as in our original model. Following the analysis of
these cases, we argue that the same result holds for a general n. Detailed proofs are
available on the authorswebsite.16
Appendix
The appendix provides the proof of all the results in the text. The following notations
are used in the proofs:
i : is strategy
i : is optimal strategy
wii : is expected payo¤ when its strategy is i (given other rmsstrategies)
 . 0 :  is slightly below 0
Mk : value of  below which exactly k mergers occur in M
Lemma 1
Suppose MnM 0 = fjg. Then, for all i 2M 0, qMi = +CMm+1   ci <
+CM cj
m   ci = qM
0
i
because +CMm+1   cj = qMj > 0. Thus, Mi < M
0
i : If MnM 0 contains more than one
rm, the same inequality continues to hold because M 0 can be reached by consecutively
removing rms, one at a time, from M .
Lemma 2
(a) If j rejects the proposal, the merger stage ends and js payo¤ is Mj . If j accepts
the o¤er, js payo¤ is T if j is the acquiree (i < j) and vMnij   T if j is the acquirer
(i > j). Hence the conclusion.
16The address is http://ihome.ust.hk/~wenzhou/supplement(Qiu & Zhou).pdf.
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(b) Conditional on j accepting the o¤er, rm i sets T as low as possible if i is the
acquirer (i < j), so T = Mj . If i is the acquiree (i > j), rm i sets T as high as possible,




i   Mj < vMnji .
Lemma 4
(a) uM;i+kk = 
Mnk









= 2qMi  2qMnki , which is negative by Lemma 1. This means uM;i+kk >
uM;j+kk for i < j.
(b) Note















  Mnji   Mnki 
















Because i + j is the only protable merger in M , for k 2 Mnfi; jg, its optimal
strategy is pass, denoted as P . Firm is strategy set includes passand propose to
j, denoted as R(j) and so i 2 fP;R(j)g. Similarly, j 2 fP;R(i)g. If j = P , is









is greater than Mi by 
M
i;j > 0, so 














> Mi , so again 

i = R(j). That is, proposing
to j is is dominant strategy. Similarly, proposing to i is js dominant strategy.
Lemma 6
If there is no further merger, vMnmaxfi;jgminfi;jg = 
Mnj
i . Using the Cournot prots,
Mi;j = 
Mnj




where  = (m   1)(m + 1)2cj   2m(m + 1)ci   ( + CM )(m2   2m   1). As a result,
Mi;j  0 if and only if   0, which is equivalent to   Mi;j .
17Our purpose is to compare uM;i+kk with u
M;j+k
k , which is accomplished by switching i and j in M .
Therefore, CM remains constant when ci changes.
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Three rms
N = f1; 2; 3g and 0 = 5. By Assumption 2, there can be at most one merger,
which may be 1+2, 1+3 or 2+3. From Lemma 6, N1;2 = 13, 
N
1;3 = 29, 
N
2;3 = 17. For
17 <   29, 1+3 is the only protable merger and therefore the unique equilibrium
(Lemma 5).
For 13 <   17, there are two protable mergers: 1+3 and 2+3. Both involve rm
3. By Lemma 4(a), uN;1+33 > u
N;2+3
3 , so 

























2 , so 


















2 , so 

2 = P . Therefore, 

2 = P regardless of 1. Given








1 , so 

1 = R(3). The strategy prole of the
three rms, (R(3); P;R(1)), leads to a unique equilibrium merger of 1+3.
For   13, all three mergers are protable. vNn23 > uN;1+33 > uN;2+33 > N3 , so
3 2 fP;R(1)g. If 38+8
p
10











2 , so 1 2 fP;R(3)g and 2 2 fP;R(1)g. Given 2 and 3s possible






1 , so 





2 = P and 

3 = R(1).
The unique equilibrium is 1+3.








, so 2 = R(1).






1 . Given 

2, we have 

1 = R(3) regardless



















wP3 , so 

3 = R(1). The resulting equilibrium merger conguration is 1+3 with probabil-
ity 23 and 1+2 with probability
1
3 .








> uN;1+31 , so 1 2 fP;R(2)g. Given
2 = R(1), we have 3 = P regardless of 1. Then, 1 = R(2). The unique equilibrium
is 1+2.
The above analysis shows the general procedure of deriving the equilibrium when
there are several protable mergers. We rst determine a rms optimal choice of target
if it proposes a merger using Lemma 4 and similar preferences in other situations. Each
rms strategy then comes down to a choice between passing and proposing to the target.




N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g. If there is any merger, the acquiree must be 2, 3, 4 or 5 in
the rst round. If 2 is acquired (by 1) in the rst round, we can show (following the
analysis of the four-rm case) the further round mergers are 3+4)1+5 for  2 (43; 58].
Consequently, N1;2 = v
Nn2

















. Similarly, if 3 is acquired in
the rst round, the further round mergers are 2+4)1+5 in Nn3 for  2 (44; 59]. If 4
is acquired in the rst round, the further round mergers are 2+3)1+5 for  2 (44; 59].
The rst-round mergers in both cases are also veried to be protable. If 5 is acquired in
the rst round, then, as shown in the four-rm case, there will be no further mergers for
 > 44. But given there are no further mergers, the rst-round merger is unprotable
for  > 44.
In summary, for 44 <   59, there are six merger congurations: (a) 1+2)3+4)1+5;
(b) 1+3)2+4)1+5; (c) 2+3)2+4)1+5; (d) 1+4)2+3)1+5; (e) 2+4)2+3)1+5;
(f) 3+4 )2+3)1+5. All are protable.18 Now consider the rmspreferences of the
rst-round mergers. In the three rst-round mergers in which it would participate [(a),





fore, 1 2 fP;R(4)g in the rst round. Similarly, we nd 2; 3; 4 2 fP;R(1)g. As a




i for i = 2; 3.
Finally, given 1, 2 and 3s strategies, 4 = R(1).
The above analysis shows that, if there is a rst-round merger, there will be no
further mergers for  > 59. We also know that the most protable single merger in N is
1+5 with N1;5 = 31:1. Hence, there is no merger at all for  > 59; and there is a unique
merger conguration of 1+4)2+3)1+5 for 44 <   59.19
Six rms
N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g: We can show that N1 = 38:26, N2 = 40:43, and N3 = 45:57. If
there are four mergers with rm i being acquired in the rst round, then the remaining
ve rms will proceed as in the ve-rm case when  . Nni3 . It turns out that 
Nn3
3 =
18When 58 <   59, (a) is not protable. But this does not matter, as we show later that it would
not be the equilibrium even if it were protable.
19The conguration continues to be the unique equilibrium even when the cost distribution is more






3 = 74 while 
Nn2
3 < 74 and 
Nn6
3 < 74. So when  > 74, there are no
mergers. When  . 74, the only possible conguration involves 3, 4 or 5 being acquired
in the rst round. From now on, assume  = 74 and focus only on the rmsrst-round
strategies.
Clearly, 6 = P . Analysis of the other rms preferences leads to 1; 2; 3 2
fP;R(5)g and 4; 5 2 fP;R(2)g. The acquiree will then be either 4 or 5. Because
uN;1+51 < v
Nn5




1 , we have 

1 = P . Similarly, 

3 = P .
As a result, the only possible mergers are now 2+4 and 2+5 and they are both prof-
itable. Then, 2 = R(5). Given 1; 2; 3, we have wP4 = v
Nn5





















4 if 5 = R(2). Fur-
thermore, uN;4+24 > v
Nn5
4 , so 























> wP5 , so 

5 = R(2). Given the unique equilibrium strategies,





Suppose there are k ( n  2) rounds of mergers in N . Denote the set of remaining
rms after k rounds of mergers as X  N . Then x  jXj = n   k. The last round
merger must be i+ j for some i 2 X, j 2 NnX and j > i. By Lemma 6, this merger is
protable if and only if




(x2 + 2x)cj   2(x+ 1)ci
	  (CX + cj)
=
(x+ 1)3 + x+ 1
x2   2 cj  
2(x2 + 3x+ 2)
x2   2 ci   CX :
X[ji;j is maximized when cj is maximized while ci and CX are minimized, which means
i = 1, j = n, and X consists of the rst x rms in N , hence the expression for (k) in
the proposition.
The construction of (k) means that a necessary condition for k rounds of mergers is
 < (k). Because  = maxk (k), when  > , there are no mergers; when  . ,
the only possible merger conguration is the one characterized in the Proposition.
20For general cost distributions, we nd that all the above inequalities are valid except that (a) some-
times 3s most preferred target is 2 instead of 5; and (b) sometimes uN;4+24 < v
Nn5
2 . In the rst case,
3 = P ; in the second case, 

4 = P , leading to a unique rst-round merger of 2 + 5.
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